Game Information, Local Heroes, And Their Effect On Attendance: The Case Of The Japanese Baseball League by Yamamura, Eiji
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Game Information, Local Heroes, And
Their Effect On Attendance: The Case
Of The Japanese Baseball League
Eiji Yamamura
11. January 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19965/
MPRA Paper No. 19965, posted 12. January 2010 16:32 UTC
 1 
Game Information, Local Heroes, and their Effect on Attendance: 
The Case of the Japanese Baseball League.  
 
 
 
EIJI YAMAMURA 
Seinan Gakuin University 
 
 
Address: Department of Economics, Seinan Gakuin University, 6-2-92 Sawara-ku, Nishijin, 
Fukuoka 814-8511, Japan 
 
E-mail address: yamaei@seinan-gu.ac.jp 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
  In the Japanese Professional Baseball League, the starting pitcher is announced 
prior to the game in the Pacific League but not in the Central League. I attempt to 
investigate how the release of information concerning a starting pitcher prior to the 
game affects attendance. My major findings are: (1) In the Pacific League, the salary 
(and overall number of wins) of the home team’s starting pitcher is positively related to 
attendance, while that of the visiting team is not. (2) In the Central League, neither the 
salary (or the overall number of wins) of the home team’s starting pitcher nor that of 
the visiting team affect attendance.   
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Game information; attendance; Japanese Professional Baseball League 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
1. Introduction 
     Demand for professional sports is one of the major issues in the field of sports 
economics and much research has been undertaken to ascertain the determinants of 
attendance for baseball games (e.g., Bruggink and Eaton 1996; Burdekin and Idson 
1991; Hill et al. 1982; Hunt and Lewis 1976; Kahane and Shmanske 1997; Knowles et 
al. 1992; Noll 1974; Schmidt and Berri 2001, 2002, 2004).  It is generally 
acknowledged that information on the quality of goods is very important for consumer 
decision making.  For instance, the recent performance of the home and visiting 
teams and, hence, their current rankings are regarded as the main factors determining 
the quality of a game.  In addition, the likelihood that a star player will take part in a 
game is thought to affect fans‟ perceptions of game quality; not only because of an 
increase in the winning probability when a star participates in a game but also because 
of the star effect stemming from imperfect substitution (Rosen 1981).  As noted by 
Gwartney and Haworth (1974), “Outstanding players are thought to exert an additional 
impact on attendance because customers like to observe players of exceptional ability, 
even if they play for a „losing team‟”.  Furthermore, the degree of a star player‟s 
popularity appears to depend on the town in which a game is held since the star player 
would be more attractive to fans from the same hometown.  This is somewhat 
analogous to customer racial discrimination in the baseball market (e.g., Andersen and 
La Croix 1991; Irani 1996; Kahn and Sherer 1988; Nardinelli and Simon 1990)
1
.  The 
composition of the starting roster and the town where the game is held are closely 
related to game quality.  Previous information about the starting players is thus very 
important when the demand for the game is considered.  
  Familiarity with a home team‟s players should increase a fan‟s enjoyment of 
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the game, thereby increasing attendance (Kahane and Shmanske 1997). If a player is 
from a fan‟s home town, this sense of familiarity is further enhanced.  Accordingly, 
people are more inclined to attend a game if they know that a player coming from their 
home town is a starting member.  It follows from this that familiarity with home 
players appears to enlarge the „local star‟ effect and play an important role in 
increasing game attendance.   
 The Japanese Professional Baseball League (JPBL) has a two league system 
comprised of the Pacific and the Central Leagues (La Croix and Kawaura 1999, 
Yamamura and Shin 2008a, 2008b).  In the Pacific League, the starting pitcher is 
announced in advance of a game, while in the Central League they are not. Compared 
with other positions, pitchers vary game by game.  This feature causes game quality 
to rely considerably on the starting pitcher.  The different systems mean that fans can 
obtain information concerning game quality for Pacific League but not Central League 
games, resulting in differences in game demand behavior.  Under such conditions, the 
JPBL conditions allow me to compare people with information on game quality to ones 
without it.  Using the panel data of JPBL game attendance during the 2005-2007 
period, this research attempts to analyze how and to what extent the different systems 
between the two leagues have an influence on game attendance through the availability 
or unavailability of information prior to games and informal social connections. 
 
2. Conditions of the Japanese Professional Baseball League 
   In the post-war period, Japan‟s unprecedented economic growth resulted in 
increasing demands for the leisure industry.  The JPBL has clearly been one of the 
most popular segments of the leisure industry.  The JPBL was inaugurated in 1936 
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comprising seven teams in one league.  In 1950, JPBL was divided into two leagues, 
the Central League (CL) and the Pacific League (PL) (La Croix and Kawaura 1999).  
The Yomiuri Giants of the Central League have consistently dominated the 
JPBL and assured its supremacy.  The Giants are the premier team, similar to the New 
York Yankees in Major League Baseball.  The development and diffusion of 
broadcasting has also increased public interest in the JPBL, particularly in the Giants
2
.  
Not only fans, but also anti-fans of the Giants are interested in Giants games via 
broadcasts of baseball games.  Necessarily, other Central League teams have been 
able to attract fans‟ attentions and thereby increase attendance from games against the 
Giants.  With respect to fan popularity, as provided in the first row of Table 1, the 
mean value of attendance at Pacific League games is smaller by approximately 7,000 
compared with that of Central League games, which is statistically significant at the 
1% level.  Consistent with the conjecture, this indicates that the Central League is 
more popular than the Pacific.  The relationship between the Central and the Pacific 
Leagues appears to be similar to that between the American and National Leagues in 
Major League Baseball in the United States.  A structure in which the Central League 
teams depend upon the Giants for popularity rather than their own efforts has persisted 
over a long period of time (Kobayashi 2004).   
In an attempt to increase their popularity, the Pacific League has adopted 
various systems which the Central League does not have.  For instance, in the split 
season system adopted in the 1973-1983 period, the winners of the first and second 
halves of the season compete in a playoff to determine the Pacific League winner of 
the year.  The practice of releasing the name of the starting pitcher prior to a game 
began in 1985.  Although from 1985 to 1993 this practice was applicable to just 
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Sunday games; after 1994 the starting pitcher for all games was announced in advance.  
As reported by Yamamura and Shin (2008a), the gap in attendance between the two 
leagues did not narrow until at least the mid-1980s.  Subsequently, a rapid catch up 
then followed, particularly during the period 1985-1992, although the difference in 
attendance numbers continued to exist after even 2005 (Table 1).  Based on this I 
derive the argument that the introduction of the practice providing information about 
the starting pitcher made a substantial contribution to the rise in attendance at Pacific 
League games.  Furthermore, it seems appropriate to propose that the home team‟s 
starting pitcher announcement has a greater effect on attendance than the visiting 
team‟s because of the larger demand from fans of the home team3 .  It seems 
reasonable to postulate the following hypothesis
4
: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  If fans know who will be the starting pitcher, then the degree of his 
popularity will be positively associated with game attendance.  Furthermore, this 
effect is greater for the home team pitcher than for the visiting one.  
 
It is widely known that the Japan Professional Football League (JPFL), 
inaugurated in 1993, has become very popular mainly because of people‟s affection for 
their hometown teams (Nihon Keizai Newspaper (ed.) 2005).  By contrast, as stated 
earlier, JPBL developed considerably thanks to diffusion from broadcasting.  After 
the emergence of the JPFL, regarded as a substitute for the JPBL, it was observed that 
the popularity of JPBL drastically declined (Yamamura and Shin 2008 b).  The 
introduction of JPFL put competitive pressure on JPBL in the professional sports 
market.  Such conditions induced the Pacific League to consider it critical to attach 
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importance to the team‟s home town and local fans while the Central League is more 
likely to stick to the past way presumably as a result of past experiences of success.   
Sadaharu Oh was the manager of the Fukuoka Hawks, located in the Kyushu 
region and regarded as the dominant team in the Pacific League
5
.  He has adopted the 
principle of attaching importance to the home town in constructing the team.  
According to Oh, the key players of the Hawks mostly came from Kyushu, which is 
the southern region of Japan and approximately 900 km distant from Tokyo. Players 
who were brought up in the team‟s home town have become the main force and play an 
important role in games, leading local people to be fond of and support the team 
(Nagatani 2005)
6
.  This suggests that it is very important to foster local star players to 
attract local fans
7
.   
Under the practice of releasing the name of the starting pitcher prior to a game, 
more popular pitchers are put on the starting roster, resulting in increased attendance.  
As pointed out by Gwartney and Haworth (1974), in MLB, starting black players may 
attract black customers who had previously attended games mainly for the reason that 
they wanted to enjoy games in the stadium.  If the same logic holds true for local 
customers, then it would be reasonable to assert that the players coming from the town 
where the game is held will attract local customers who previously have not attended 
baseball games.  On the other hand, if there is prejudice against foreign players 
among baseball fans, then this system would decrease the attendance for games in 
which the starting pitcher comes from abroad. Furthermore, such informal social 
networks and discrimination effects will amplify the popularity of star players because 
local customers are more likely to become loyal supporters of star players than those 
unfamiliar to them.  These arguments can be summarized by the following 
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hypothesis: 
 
 Hypothesis 2:  Under the practice of releasing the name of the starting pitcher prior 
to a game, the magnitude of the star player’s effect on attendance would be greater 
when he came from the team’s hometown.  Furthermore, it would also be greater if he 
was Japanese, rather than foreign.   
 
Before proceeding to the regression analysis, it is useful to make a 
preliminary comparison between the two leagues across the features of starting 
pitchers.  From the top row of Table 2(a) and (b) it can be seen that attendance is 
statistically larger in cases when the home team‟s starting pitcher‟s home town is the 
same as the team‟s hometown in the Pacific and Central leagues.  On the other hand, 
attendance does not increase even if the visiting pitcher comes from the home team 
town, regardless of the league.  Looking at the third and fourth rows shows that 
attendance at PL games was significantly smaller in games when the starting pitcher 
was a foreigner, while there is no such effect at CL games.  These findings are almost 
congruent with expectations.  Nevertheless, as shown in the results of the CL, 
characteristics of the starting pitcher partly affects attendance even when no previous 
information released concerning the starting pitcher.  Such an unexpected result calls 
for additional investigation.   
Although baseball has been among the most popular leisure industries in 
Japan, few researchers have attempted to examine how people become fans and decide 
to attend the baseball games of JPBL.  This might partly be because the exact 
attendance numbers could not be obtained
8
.  In 2004, JPBL confronted this difficulty 
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and carried out a reform because of its substantial decline in popularity (Nihon Keizai 
Newspaper, 2005, Ninomiya and Higuchi 2005)
9
.  As a consequence, accurate 
attendance figures began to be announced for each game from 2005.  Therefore, the 
availability of accurate data in 2005, 2006, and 2007 enabled me to investigate how 
and to what extent releasing the name of the starting pitcher affects game attendance 
by comparing the PL and CL.  I use an originally constructed panel data set to 
examine the above hypotheses in the following section.    
 
3. Econometric Framework and Estimation Results. 
 
A.  Econometric framework 
       To examine the empirical hypotheses raised in the previous section, the basic 
regression equation takes the following form: 
Ln(ATTEN)ijst= 1Ln(HPAY)ijst  + 2 Ln(VPAY)ijst  
+ 3 Ln(HPAY)ijst *HHOM ijst +4 Ln(VPAY)ijst *VHOM ijst  
+5 Ln(HPAY)ijst *HFOREjst +6 Ln(VPAY)ijst *VFOREjst 
+ 7 Ln(HWINR)ijst +8 Ln(VWINR)ijst  
+ 9WKENDst + 10HOLIDst + s +νij+uijst , 
where ATTEN ijst represents the dependent variable (attendance per game) in prefecture 
i, stadium j, year s, and date of game t. ‟s represents the regression parameters.  s,νij, 
uijst represent the unobservable specific effects in the s’s year (a fixed effect time 
vector), the individual effects of j „s stadium in i „s prefecture (a fixed effects 
prefecture vector) and an error term, respectively.  A panel structure is used for the 
data set in this study.  In particular, special attention needs to be paid to the omitted 
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variable bias stemming from unobservable individual stadium characters and access to 
the stadium.  In addition, various substitute goods often exist in the surrounding 
area
10
.  With the aim of controlling for these variables, fixed effects estimation is 
employed (Baltagi, 2005)
11
.  Year dummies were also incorporated to control for s, 
which represents conditional and structural changes at the macro level and could affect 
the demand for baseball game tickets.  
Ticket prices, which are expect to have a significant effect on game attendance, 
are fixed within a season but vary between seasons for the same team. Besides the 
pitcher, other members of a team do not greatly vary during the season.  The regular 
members, however, would be different each season because team strategy appears to 
depend upon the performance of the past season.  For the purpose of controlling for 
ticket prices and regular team members, interaction terms between year and stadium 
dummies are incorporated as independent variables. These interaction terms also 
control for the level of income and population size of places where games are held. 
 In an attempt to estimate the elasticity to compare the magnitude of the dependent 
variables, the function takes a linear form
12
.  Dependent and independent variables 
are evaluated at the sample means, and therefore the coefficient values reported can be 
interpreted as elasticity
13
. The error terms for games being held at the same stadium 
might correlate because conditions are shared. Otherwise, the standard errors of the 
coefficients might be biased downward (Moulton 1990). To control for this bias, robust 
standard errors are calculated by clustering on the home stadium. Then, t-values are 
obtained by the cluster–robust standard errors. 
     To examine Hypothesis 1, check HPAY and VPAY stand for the salary of home 
team‟s starting pitcher and that of the visiting one, respectively.  There are a number 
 11 
of measures of a team‟s popularity, such as the performance during past years, player 
numbers selected to play in all star games, and the number of championship titles.  In 
this paper, salary is considered to represent these factors and popularity because not 
only the player‟s record but also some subjective charm might attract fans and 
therefore increase the revenues of team.  Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that 
team revenue is positively associated with the salary of its players.  As a consequence, 
the extent of a player‟s popularity and his „stardom‟ is thought to be reflected in their 
salary. Even prior to a new season, salary data of new players can be available since it 
is set out in the player‟s signing contract.  While the salary of starting pitchers is a 
convincing way to proxy a pitcher‟s record and popularity it may not capture the full 
impact. Market imperfections can greatly affect player salaries. In the JPBL, free 
agents are able to earn their economic worth but younger players face market 
constraints. Under such conditions, using only the pitchers‟ starting salaries will distort 
the results. It is necessary to use an alternative measure with the aim of checking the 
robustness of estimation results. To this end, I also use the overall number of wins of 
starting pitchers as a proxy of a starting pitcher‟s popularity. Hence, I employ the 
alternative specification where HSPWIN and VSPWIN, representing the overall number 
of wins of a home starting pitcher and those of the visitor starting pitcher, to capture 
popularity instead of HPAY and VAPY.  The advantage of this variable is that number 
of wins avoids bias under market constraints. New pitchers have, however, no recorded 
performance in the JPBL and so are omitted from the sample when estimations are 
conducted using the overall number of wins as a proxy of the popularity of starting 
pitchers
14
.  
Following the discussion up to this point, a home pitcher would be more attractive 
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locally for home fans than visiting ones even if their performance and charm do not 
greatly differ.  If Hypothesis 1 is supported, I expect that the signs of HPAY and VPAY 
to be positive and the magnitude of HPAY larger than that of VPAY in PL estimations.  
However, there would be no effect on them in the CL because of the lack of 
information about the starting pitcher.  
To capture the characteristics of the starting pitcher, I defined various dummies 
as follows.  HHOM is 1 when the home team‟s starting pitcher‟s hometown is the 
town in which game was held, otherwise it is 0.  VHOM is 1 when the visiting team‟s 
starting pitcher‟s hometown is the town in which the game was held, otherwise it is 0.  
HFORE is 1 when the home team‟s starting pitcher is a foreigner, otherwise it is 0.  
VFORE is 1 when the visiting team‟s starting pitcher is a foreigner, otherwise it is 0.  
To examine Hypothesis 2 concerning the starting pitcher‟s hometown effect on his 
local popularity, the interaction of HPAY with HHOM, and of VPAY with VHOM, are 
incorporated.  Their anticipated signs are positive, indicating that the salary of starting 
pitchers makes a greater contribution to a rise in attendance if he comes from the 
team‟s hometown.  Furthermore, with the aim of determining the effect of foreigners 
on attendance, the interaction of HPAY with HFORE, of VPAY with VFORE, are 
incorporated. They are predicted to take negative signs since discrimination against 
foreign players would decrease his popularity, leading to a decline in attendance. 
 Following previous reports (e.g., Bruggink et al. 1996, Irani 1996, Kahane and 
Shmanske, Knowles et al. 1992, Whitney 1988), I include various control variables as 
below.   
The home team plays a match against a visiting team, and therefore the value of 
a game is determined not only by the quality of the home team but also by the visiting 
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team. Hence, I incorporate HWINR and VWIN, which are the winning percentages of 
the home and away teams, respectively, in the current season prior to the game. It 
seems reasonable that fans enjoy seeing their team win and would like to see their 
team‟s win the championship.  This leads me to expect the signs of these variables to 
be positive.   
Because fewer people work on weekends and national holidays, the opportunity 
cost of attending games at these times is lower.  Inevitably, both of these dummy 
variables denoted as WKEND and HOLID are expected to have a positive effect on 
attendance. 
 
B.  Results and discussion (HPAY and VPAY used to capture popularity) 
  As already noted, data are at game level during the 2005-2007 seasons, and total 
observations of the Pacific and the Central Leagues are 804 and 822, respectively. 
These samples do not include games played away from the home cities of either team. 
Game attendance, team win rate, weekend dummy, and holiday dummy were collected 
from the baseball yearbook, Nihon Puro-yakyu Kiroku Nenkan (various years).  
Starting pitcher characteristics are from the directory of baseball players, Puro-yakyu 
Senshu Meikan (various years). 
   Table 3 presents the results when HPAY and VPAY are used to capture popularity, 
and Table 4 provides results when HSPWIN and VSPWIN capture the popularity.  In 
Tables 3 and 4, columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) exhibit the results for the PL, whereas (2), 
(4), (6), and (8) show those for the CL.  I now look at Table 3.  
 It can be seen from the first and second rows of Table 3 that the signs of HPAY 
and VPAY are positive in all estimations.  In column (1), showing a PL result, HPAY is 
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statistically significant at the 1% level, whereas VPAY is significant at the 5 % level.  
What is more, the value of HPAY is 0.02, which is distinctly larger than that of VPAY, 
0.006.  Because a pitcher‟s salary is considered a proxy for his quality, this implies 
that a 1% increase in the salary of the home team‟s starting pitcher leads to 0.02% 
augmentation in attendance, whereas a 1% higher amount in the salary of visiting 
team‟s pitcher results in only a 0.006 % rise in attendance.  In the case of the CL, 
shown in a column (2), in contrast with the PL, both VPAY and HPAY are not 
statistically significant. The results for the PL and CL are consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
Turning to the interaction terms of HPAY*HHOM and VPAY*VHOM; these yield 
positive signs, while HPAY*HHOM become statistically significant at the 5 % level in 
results for the PL seen in columns (3) and (7). On the other hand, as seen in the results 
for the CL in columns (4) and (8), HPAY*HHOM and VPAY*VHOM produce negative 
signs and are not statistically significant. These results indicate that the salary of a 
starting pitcher who comes from a team‟s hometown has a greater effect on attendance 
than that of one coming from outside, but only when the stating pitcher is announced 
beforehand. This holds for home starting pitchers, but not for visitor starting pitchers.  
With respect to the HPAY*HFORE, and VPAY*VFORE, as exhibited in columns (5) 
and (7), their coefficients for the PL take negative signs, and in particular 
HPAY*HFORE are statistically significant at the 1 % level, indicating that a foreign 
starting pitcher‟s salary has a smaller effect on attendance than a Japanese pitcher‟s 
salary. This association holds for home starting pitchers, but not for visitor starting 
pitchers. This result supports Hypothesis 2. On the other hand, in the CL estimation, 
HPAY*HFORE show a positive sign in columns (6) and (8). 
As for the various control variables, in line with the prediction, HWINR and VWIN 
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take positive signs in all estimations. Furthermore, with the exception of HWINR of the 
PL, they are statistically significant. As anticipated previously, WKEND and HOLID 
show positive signs and are statistically significant at the 1 % level in all estimations. 
These results indicate that attendances on weekends and holidays are significantly 
larger than on weekdays.   
 
C. Results and discussion (HSPWIN and VSPWIN used to capture popularity) 
   I now look at the results of an alternative specification when HSPWIN and 
VSPWIN are used as proxies of starting pitchers‟ popularity instead of HPAY and VPAY, 
provided in Table 4.  As shown in columns (1) and (2), HSPWIN yields positive signs 
and is statistically significant at the 1 % level in the PL, but not the CL. The magnitude 
of the coefficient of HSPWIN is 0.02 in the PL. This is consistent with the result of 
HPAY shown in Table3. Signs of VSPWIN are negative and statistically insignificant 
both in the PL and CL. Considering these results together; in the PL, home starting 
pitchers have a positive effect on attendance. The combined results indicate that the 
positive impact from the home team‟s starting pitcher is far larger than that of the 
visiting team‟s pitcher, which strongly supports Hypothesis 1.  
As for the interaction term, in the case of the PL shown in columns (3) and (7), 
signs of HSPWIN*HHOM and VSPWIN*VHOM are positive, with HSPWIN*HHOM, 
statistically significant. On the other hand, in the case of the CL shown in columns (4) 
and (8), they are not statistically significant. These results are similar to those for 
HPAY*HHOM and VPAY*VHOM presented in Table 3.   
As regards HSPWIN*HFOR and VSPWIN*VFORE, they do not become statistically 
significant in all estimations although HSPWIN*HFOR of the PL takes a predicted 
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negative sign. These are out line with the results in Table 3. This might partly be 
because games of new starting pitchers are excluded from the sample, causing 
HSPWIN*HFOR to be insignificant. 
Overall, given the practice of announcing starting pitchers, information of starting 
pitchers who come from a team‟s hometown significantly enhance the effects of their 
salary and the overall number of wins on game attendance.  
   With respect to other variables, coefficients of HWINR and VWINR take positive 
signs in all specifications, while those of HWINR are not statistically insignificant. The 
combined results of Tables 3 and 4 indicate that attendance with respect to the home 
team‟s win rate is less elastic than that of the visiting team‟s. I interpret this as 
indicating that compared with the visiting team‟s fans, the home team‟s are more 
interested simply in seeing their home team play rather than the team‟s performance, 
presumably as a result of their addictive behavior.  WKEND and HOLID were almost 
the same as in Table 3 and therefore hardly affected in the alternative estimation. 
   Overall, the findings presented in this section strongly and consistently support 
my hypotheses
15
.  
 
4. Conclusion 
       It is generally acknowledged that information on the quality of goods is very 
important for consumer decision making.  The quality of a baseball game is 
determined by various factors, one of which is the team‟s player composition.  
Compared with other positions, which are usually occupied by the regular position 
players, the starting pitcher changes for each game.  It seems crucial for fans to obtain 
information about the starting pitcher prior to making a decision on game attendance.  
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In addition, a player‟s salary is to some extent considered to reflect not only his 
performance but also the extent of his popularity.  As regards game attendance, the 
popularity of a player appears to depend on the city in which the game is held, an issue 
arising from consumer discrimination (Becker 1971).  It seems reasonable to assert 
that, other things being equal, fans are likely to prefer home team players to visiting 
team players.  Furthermore, because of informal social connections, they appear to be 
fond of players whose hometown is the same as the home team‟s.  As a result, the 
starting pitcher seems to have an effect upon game attendance and the magnitude of 
this effect relies upon the city in which game is held.  
 In the case of JPBL, the starting pitcher is announced prior to the game in the 
PL, but not in the CL. These different practices between leagues is expected to have an 
affect on attendance.  Comparing the PL and CL, I attempted to investigate how and 
to what extent the release of information on the starting pitcher prior to a game affects 
attendance.  The major findings from the fixed effect estimation are as follows:  
(1) In the PL, the salary (overall number of wins) of the home team‟s starting 
pitcher is positively related to attendance.  
 (2) In the CL, neither the salary (overall number of wins) of the home or the 
visiting team‟s starting pitcher affects game attendance. 
(3) In the case of the PL, the positive effect of salary (overall number of wins) on 
attendance is larger when the starting pitcher‟s is from the same hometown as that of 
the team when a game is held in that town.  On the other hand, the effect of salary 
declines when the starting pitcher is a foreigner. 
Based on these findings, I argue that the release of information on a pitcher 
increases demand for local „star players‟, whereby local residents are more likely to 
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attend a game.  The practice of announcing pitchers prior to a game in the PL is a 
suitable strategy for satisfying the demands of local fans. 
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Table 1. Mean values for the Pacific and Central leagues. 
 
 
Notes: ** and * means that difference is significant at the 1 % and 5% level, respectively. 
a. Games played away from the home cities of either team are not included in the sample. 
b.  Winning percentage in the current season prior to the game.
Variables Definition Pacific Central All t-value 
ATTEN
 a 
Attendance per game
 
 
20,343 27,600 24,081 14.5** 
HPAY Salary of home team‟s starting pitcher 
(in millions of  Yen) 
61   83 72 6.17** 
VPAY Salary of visitor team‟s starting pitcher 
 
63 83 73 5.53** 
HSPWIN 
 
An overall number of wins of home team‟s 
starting pitcher 
31 47 39 7.94** 
VSPWIN 
 
Overall number of wins of visitor team‟s starting 
pitcher 
32 47 40 7.70** 
HWINR
 b 
 
Home team‟s win rate during the current season 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.04 
VWINR
 b
 
 
Visiting team‟s win rate  during the current 
season 
0.48 0.49 0.49 0.52 
HHOM Is 1 when home team starting pitcher‟s home town 
is the town in which game was held, otherwise 0. 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 
VHOM Is 1 when visitor team starting pitcher‟s home 
town is the town in which game was held, 
otherwise 0. 
0.04 0.02 0.03 2.05* 
HFORE Is 1 when home team starting pitcher is a 
foreigner, otherwise 0. 
0.16 0.16 0.16 0.02 
VFORE 
 
Is 1 when visitor team starting pitcher is a 
foreigner, otherwise 0. 
0.17 0.15 0.16 1.38 
WKEND 
 
Is 1 when game was held on a weekend, otherwise 
0. 
0.36 0.35 0.36 0.82 
HOLID 
 
Is 1 when game was held on a holiday, otherwise 
0. 
0.63 0.63 0.63 0.01 
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Table 2.  Comparison of characteristics of starting pitchers 
 
(a) Comparison of average number of game attendance among starting pitcher characteristics. (Pacific League) 
Home team‟s starting pitcher‟s hometown same 
as the town in which game was held. 
Others t-value 
27,428 (37) 20,059 (923) 5.48** 
Visiting team‟s starting pitcher‟s hometown 
same as the town in which game was held. 
Others  
19,552 (38) 20,376 (922) 0.61 
Home team‟s starting pitcher is a foreigner Others  
18,064 (157) 20,789 (803) 3.86** 
Visiting team‟s starting pitcher is a foreigner Others  
       19,343 (166) 20,545 (794)   1.68* 
 
(b) Comparison of average number of game attendance among starting pitcher characteristics. (Central League) 
Home team‟s starting pitcher‟s home town same 
as the town in which game was held. 
Others t-value 
35,570 (40) 27,274 (980) 3.88** 
Visiting team‟s starting pitcher‟s home town 
same as the town in which game was held. 
Others  
25,630 (24) 27,647 (996) 0.73 
Home team‟s starting pitcher is a foreigner Others  
26,129 (163) 27,879 (857) 1.53 
Visiting team‟s starting pitcher is a foreigner Others  
       26,269 (153) 27,834 (867)    1.34 
Notes: Values in parentheses are number of observations. ** and * means that difference is significant at the 1 % 
and 5% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.  Determinants of attendance (Fixed Effects estimation) 
 
Variables (1) 
Pacific 
(2) 
Central 
(3) 
Pacific 
(4) 
Central 
(5) 
Pacific 
(6) 
Central 
(7) 
Pacific 
(8) 
Central 
HPAY 0.02** 
(3.34) 
0.004 
(1.03) 
0.02** 
(3.04) 
0.004 
(1.05) 
0.03** 
(4.21) 
0.004 
(0.93) 
0.02** 
(3.87) 
0.004 
(0.95) 
VPAY 0.006* 
(2.23) 
0.005 
(1.04) 
0.005* 
(1.71) 
0.005 
(0.94) 
0.01* 
(2.21) 
0.005 
(1.07) 
0.009 
(2.13) 
0.005 
(0.92) 
HPAY* 
HHOM 
  0.001* 
(1.77) 
-0.0007 
(-1.30) 
  0.001* 
(1.85) 
-0.0007 
(-1.33) 
VPAY* 
VHOM 
  0.001 
(1.42) 
-0.0007 
(-0.08) 
  0.0009 
(1.42) 
-0.0007 
(-0.08) 
HPAY* 
HFORE 
    -0.002** 
(-2.89) 
0.0001 
(0.05) 
-0.002** 
(-2.86) 
0.0001 
(0.04) 
VPAY* 
VFORE 
    -0.01 
(-1.28) 
0.00004 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(-1.27) 
0.00003 
(0.01) 
HWINR 
 
0.04 
(0.71) 
0.09* 
(1.76) 
0.04 
(0.72) 
0.09* 
(1.77) 
0.04 
(0.74) 
0.09* 
(1.75) 
0.04 
(0.75) 
0.09* 
(1.76) 
VWINR 
 
0.14** 
(3.29) 
0.13** 
(3.76) 
0.14** 
(3.32) 
0.13** 
(3.81) 
0.13** 
(3.16) 
0.13** 
(4.00) 
0.13** 
(3.19) 
0.13** 
(4.09) 
WKEND 
 
0.08** 
(6.57) 
0.04** 
(4.66) 
0.08** 
(6.57) 
0.04** 
(4.68) 
0.08** 
(6.52) 
0.04** 
(4.76) 
0.08** 
(6.53) 
0.04** 
(4.79) 
HOLID 
 
0.02** 
(4.25) 
0.01** 
(3.23) 
0.02** 
(4.26) 
0.01** 
(3.22) 
0.02** 
(4.20) 
0.01** 
(3.17) 
0.02** 
(4.21) 
0.01** 
(3.17) 
R-square 0.37 0.20 0.34 0.20 0.34 0.20 0.35 0.20 
Observations 804 822 804 822 804 822 804 822 
Notes: HHOM , VHOM, HFORE, VFORE, and Year dummies are included in the function but not reported to save space. Numbers in parentheses are 
t-values calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the stadium. ** and * means statistically significant at the 1 % and 5% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.  Determinants of Attendance (Fixed Effects estimation) 
Variables (1) 
Pacific 
(2) 
Central 
(3) 
Pacific 
(4) 
Central 
(5) 
Pacific 
(6) 
Central 
(7) 
Pacific 
(8) 
Central 
HSPWIN 
 
0.02** 
(2.72) 
0.007 
(0.97) 
0.02** 
(2.54) 
0.007 
(0.96) 
0.02** 
(3.39) 
0.007 
(0.98) 
0.02** 
(3.19) 
0.007 
(0.97) 
VSPWIN 
 
-0.001 
(-0.37) 
-0.001 
(-0.38) 
-0.002 
(-0.50) 
-0.002 
(-0.41) 
-0.03 
(-0.48) 
-0.002 
(-0.59) 
-0.003 
(-0.59) 
-0.003 
(-0.56) 
HSPWIN* 
HHOM 
  0.003* 
(2.23) 
-0.0001 
(-0.20) 
  0.002* 
(1.97) 
-0.0001 
(-0.16) 
VSPWIN* 
VHOM 
  0.001 
(0.80) 
0.0003 
(0.42) 
  0.001 
(0.81) 
0.0003 
(0.46) 
HSPWIN* 
HFORE 
    -0.007 
(-1.41) 
0.0001 
(0.16) 
-0.006 
(-1.37) 
0.0002 
(0.21) 
VSPWIN* 
VFORE 
    0.03 
(0.50) 
0.001 
(0.51) 
0.003 
(0.49) 
0.001 
(0.51) 
HWINR 
 
0.03 
(0.52) 
0.12 
(1.56) 
0.03 
(0.53) 
0.11 
(1.55) 
0.04 
(0.56) 
0.12 
(1.57) 
0.04 
(0.57) 
0.11 
(1.57) 
VWINR 
 
0.13** 
(3.12) 
0.15** 
(2.47) 
0.13** 
(3.11) 
0.14** 
(2.54) 
0.13** 
(3.42) 
0.14** 
(2.52) 
0.13** 
(3.41) 
0.14** 
(2.60) 
WKEND 
 
0.09** 
(6.19) 
0.04** 
(3.83) 
0.09** 
(6.13) 
0.04** 
(3.80) 
0.08** 
(6.23) 
0.04** 
(3.77) 
0.09** 
(6.17) 
0.04** 
(3.75) 
HOLID 
 
0.02** 
(4.92) 
0.01** 
(3.13) 
0.02** 
(4.91) 
0.01** 
(3.09) 
0.02** 
(4.96) 
0.01** 
(3.10) 
0.02** 
(4.95) 
0.01** 
(3.06) 
R-square 0.37 0.19 0.37 0.19 0.37 0.19 0.37 0.19 
Observations 598 604 598 604 598 604 598 604 
Notes: HHOM , VHOM, HFORE, VFORE, and Year dummies are included in the function but not reported to save space. Numbers in parentheses are 
t-values calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the stadium. ** and * means statistically significant at the 1 % and 5% level, respectively.  
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1 Becker (1971) was the first to theoretically account for the phenomenon of discrimination in 
the market. 
2
 Almost all games of the Giants were broadcast nationwide because the Giants owner and 
sponsor is the Yomiuri Group, a newspaper publishing company that holds subsidiary 
companies including the TV broadcasting company, Nihon Television.   
3
 As shown in Table 1, there is hardly any difference between home team and visitor team win 
rates for either league.  Total win rate of home and visitor teams does not reach 1 since there 
are some games ended in a draw. 
4
 A number of prior reports have examined how the characteristics of starting pitchers affects 
the outcomes of attendance (Scully 1974, Hill et al. 1982, Bruggink et al 1996). 
5
 Sadaharu Oh was a prestigious player and member of the Giants during their golden age in 
the 1960s in which the Giants retained the championship for 9 years.  In conjunction with the 
team dominance and development of JPBL, he became a nationwide superstar.  After Oh 
retired as a player he became supervisor of the Giants from 1984-1988, leading them to a 
pennant race win, during which time the Giants benefited from the broadcasting effect.  From 
1995 to 2008 he was supervisor of Pacific League team, the Fukuoka Hawks.  When Oh 
became supervisor, the Hawks were unpopular and weak.   The hawks, however, became the 
most dominant and popular team in the Pacific League, presumably due to the competence of 
Oh. 
6
 According to Baseball Magazine (2009), the percentage share of the Hawk‟s rookies coming 
from the Kyushu region was 34.9% during 1995-2006 period. On the other hand, during the 
same period, that of the Giant‟s rookies coming from Tokyo (the Giant‟s home) was only 7.6%. 
Oh also pointed out that during his time as a player, the Giants experienced a drop in support 
of local fans because they focused too much on gaining nationwide popularity (Nagatani 
2005). 
7
 Yoshio Higuchi has also pointed out the importance of fostering local star players in the 
resurgence of baseball‟s popularity (Ninomiya and Higuchi 2005, p.1973) 
8
 Until 2004, each team reported the overestimated attendance number. In 1981 
season, the winners of the PL and CL were the Fighters and Giants, respectively. Both 
teams home was Korakuen Stadium. As stated earlier, the Giants are the most popular 
team in the JPBL. Further, if an overestimated attendance number is reported, there 
is no difference of attendance at Korakuen between Fighters and Giants. Based on 
 28 
                                                                                                                                                     
available data (Usami 1993), total annual attendance at Korakuen stadium for 
Fighters’ games was 13.7 million whereas for Giants’ games it was 29.0 millions. This 
suggests that attendance data prior to 2005 reflects, to some extent, the real situation. 
Hence, it is worth while referring to previous reports using JPBL attendance data 
prior to 2005 (Yamamura and Shin 2008a, 2008b).  
9
 Decline in popularity is represented, for instance, in the drop of the program ratings of JPBL 
games (Yamamura and Shin 2008b). 
10
 Examples of substitutes are other professional baseball teams, professional football team‟s, 
and other amusement facilities. 
11
 It is very difficult to incorporate the ticket price as an independent variable because various 
types of tickets are sold and therefore prices vary within a stadium (Puro-yakyu Senshu Meikan, 
various years).  There are two choices to measure the ticket price.  First, as discussed in the 
literature (e.g., Noll 1974, Schmidt and Berri 2001 ), there is a way to constructed average 
price by weighting the ticket prices for each class of seats in each stadium by that class of 
seat‟s share of stadium capacity.  The scarcity of data about class of seats prevents me from 
constructing the price data. Second, average realized ticket price can be obtained by dividing 
ticket revenue by attendance (Kahane and Shmanske 1997).  Nonetheless, it is impossible to 
obtain figures for ticket revenue and therefore to calculate price.  Knowles et al (1992), 
however, asserted that within a given season ticket prices do not vary and therefore omission of 
price variables would not result in a bias.   The sets of prices in each stadium were almost 
unchanged during the studied period 2005-2007 (Puro-yakyu Senshu Meikan, various years).  
This means that the ticket price of each stadium can be considered to be a time-invariant fixed 
effect.  Accordingly, the fixed effect estimation allows me to control for a price effect since 
the unobservable stadium specific effects can be controlled for.  In addition to price, 
substitute goods such as other professional sports teams and amusement parks also hardly 
change during the studied period and can thus be controlled for. 
12 Unfortunately, there is no theoretical model supporting the linear form. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to theoretically justify the function form.  This is an issue 
remaining for future study. 
13
 For more details, see Greene (Greene1997, p.280). 
  In the linear model, exy  '  the elasticity of y with respect to changes in x is 
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Values estimated at sample means  
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14
 The record of pitchers in the previous season and their current records prior to the game 
would be other alternative measures. Nevertheless, these measures are not better than overall 
records as a proxy for popularity. The reasons are: Japanese pitchers are increasingly moving 
to the United States to become Major League Baseball players; for example Hideo Nomo, 
Hideki Irabu, and Daisuke Matsuzaka. If dismissed from a Major League team, some return to 
JPBL, but do not have a previous season‟s record in JPBL. In the case of a returnee, the overall 
records before moving to the United States can be used as a proxy for popularity. There is no 
current record prior to the first game and therefore the first game is omitted from the sample.  
15
 Weather on game day, game time and variable for special promotions can be considered to 
influence attendance. This paper, however, cannot take into account these factors because of 
the lack of such data for the JPBL. Hence, special attention needs to be given to the results of 
this paper. 
